Does the High Court’s Miranda Judgment comport with UK Supreme Court precedent?

Arguably, Lord Justice Law’s reasoning in Mr. Miranda’s case in regard to whether the police powers under Section 7 are overbroad and arbitrary and disproportionately interfere with freedom of expression conflicts with dicta in the UK Supreme Court’s decision in R v Gul [2013] UKSC [64 ] (Oct. 23, 2013). There, the UK Supreme Court (Lords Neuberger, Hope, Mance, Judge, Kerr and Reed and Lady Hale) reasoned that, “[U]nder Schedule 7 to the 2000 Act, the power to stop, question and detain in port or at borders is left to the examining officer. The power is not subject to any controls. Indeed, the officer is not even required to have grounds for suspecting that the person detained falls within section 40(1) of the 2000 Act …, or even that any offence has been or may be committed, before commencing an examination to see whether the person falls within that subsection.” The Court recognized that it was not faced with the issue of whether the Schedule 7 powers were lawful. “On this appeal, we are not, of course, directly concerned with that issue….” Nonetheless, the Supreme Court justices opined that, “[D]etention of the kind provided for in the Schedule represents the possibility of serious invasions of personal liberty.”

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